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Has Java Changed Anything? The Sound
and Fury of Innovation Litigation
David McGowan t
Are we better off now than we were six years ago? Has the
Justice Department's suit against Microsoft improved the lot of
consumers?
Has it improved the rate or direction of
innovation? The government's action was the largest and most
sustained effort in a generation to use antitrust litigation to
improve competition in a technology market. The result should
tell us whether antitrust litigation in such markets is likely to
enhance welfare. Unfortunately, it does not.
There is no good way to tell whether consumers or
innovation benefited from the Justice Department's suit. That
conclusion would hold even if the government had broken
Microsoft into different firms. Answers are lacking in part
because it is too early to tell how the settlement between
Microsoft and the government will affect the relevant markets.
In part, however, answers are lacking because the government
had little concrete evidence that Microsoft harmed consumers
or innovation.'
Insofar as innovation is concerned, the most promising
aspect of the government's case focused on Microsoft's actions
regarding the Java technologies developed by Sun
Microsystems. This short Article uses the government's Javarelated claims to explain why the government's victory on its
t Associate Professor of Law & Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar,
University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to Dan Farber, Dan Gifford,
Mark Lemley, Christopher Leslie, and Bill Page for their comments.
Remaining mistakes are my fault.
1. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust
Injury in the Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 841, 848-49 (2001)
(discussing the difficulties with antitrust injury theories based on Microsoft's
behavior). The question really should be posed in terms of net results. Even if
the government's case produced benefits, they were costly to obtain. If we
take into account the costs of litigation, including the money Microsoft and its
competitors spent on lobbying, the money the government spent pursuing the
case, and the possibility that resources were diverted from productive to
unproductive uses, we simply add another layer of uncertainty to the mix.
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Java claims does not imply that Microsoft actually harmed
competition, a fact that in turn implies, as to this aspect of the
case, that we cannot be confident that the government's case
increased welfare by enhancing innovation.
Part I of this Article explains the Java-related allegations
and examines the government's evidence of those allegations.
It concludes that the record evidence provides only weak
support for the findings in the case. Part II discusses what this
means for future cases and offers recommendations for how the
law should deal with such cases.
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY
The Justice Department has litigated with Microsoft for
several years. In this Article, I focus only on events relating to
the Internet, middleware, and cross-platform technology. This
aspect of the case began in 1997, when the Justice Department
alleged that Microsoft violated an earlier consent decree by
requiring hardware manufacturers to license its Internet
Explorer web browser as a condition of licensing its Windows
2
operating system.
A. THE BROWSER PLATFORM THEORY

The government's first theory about how Microsoft harmed
competition rested on the premise that Netscape's Navigator
web browser was a potential substitute for Microsoft's Windows
operating system. 3 The government claimed that by harming
Netscape, Microsoft kept the browser from becoming
an actual
4
substitute, thereby maintaining its monopoly.
At this stage, the Java technologies (which I describe in a
moment) were literally a footnote.5 The browser theory lost
appeal over time, however. The idea that Netscape's browser

2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940, 950-51 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (describing the district court's finding that Microsoft was not in
contempt of the settlement decree and reversing a district court order
.preventing Microsoft from conditioning original equipment manufacturer

licenses of its operating system on agreements to license its web browser).
3. See id. at 939; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java
Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a ProprietaryStandard, 43
ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 734 (1998) (describing the Justice Department's
theories in the contempt proceeding against Microsoft).
4. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
5. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 939 n.1.
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would become a substitute for Windows suffered a serious blow
when Netscape's chief executive, James Barksdale, testified at
trial that even Netscape never thought its browser could be a
6
complete substitute for Windows.
B. THE JAVA PLATFORM THEORY
The government may have sensed that in the foreseeable
future the browser had little chance of becoming a viable
substitute for Windows. 7 When it filed its civil complaint in
1998, it emphasized Sun's Java technologies much more than it
had in the contempt proceeding. 8 In the new account, web
browsers still were alleged to be potential substitutes, but they
also were significant as the "primary distribution vehicle for
Java virtual machines... the software programs necessary to
run programs written in the Java programming language." 9
As relevant to the trial, the Java technologies form a
translation system in four parts. The Java programming
language allows developers to write applications. The Java
class libraries expose application program interfaces (APIs)
developers can use to write programs that will run through a
Java compiler. The compiler compiles Java source code written
to Java APIs into Java bytecode. That bytecode runs through a
Java Virtual Machine (JVM). JVMs are software machines
written for different operating systems. They translate Java
bytecode into instructions that can be understood by the
operating system for which the JVM is written. 0
6. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 1, at 858 (quoting Barksdale
testimony); David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in
Antitrust Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 787 n.199 (quoting Barksdale

testimony).
7. Indeed, at the end of trial the government submitted a proposed
finding of fact stating that "[oither 'platform' products, such as Internet
browsers and Java, are not good substitutes for operating systems because

they cannot function without an operating system." Pls.' Joint Proposed
Findings of Fact 1 19.1, Microsoft (No. 98-1232), http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/cases/f2600/2613.htm [hereinafter Findings] (last visited Feb. 25,
2003). This finding reflected a dilemma both sides faced. It was impossible to
argue about whether Microsoft had a monopoly without saying existing

competition was threatening (Microsoft) or feeble (the government). On the
question whether Microsoft's acts thwarted realistic substitutes, however,
each side reversed its position.
8. See Compl. 91 7-8, 68, Microsoft (No. 98-1232), http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
9. Id. 9168.
10. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 (D.D.C. 1999);
see also Daniel J. Gifford & David McGowan, A Microsoft Dialog, 44
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1. Java as Supporting the Browser
The idea that Java could bolster the browser allegations
lost some of its force when the evidence showed that Netscape
fell behind in its Java engineering efforts. By 1998, it could not
distribute versions of Sun's JVM that complied with Sun's
then-current standards.11 One could of course blame Microsoft
for Netscape's failure to keep its Java effort current, but the
12
connection is not clear.
The two worst things Microsoft did to Netscape were to
give its own browser away for free and to insist that original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) license Internet Explorer as
a condition of getting Windows. Evidence at trial suggested the
free browser policy is what caused Netscape to fall behind in its
Java efforts, 13 but the district court did not find that this policy
broke the law 14 and the government did not press the point on
appeal. 15 As to pre-installing Explorer, if Microsoft were
forbidden from making such demands, OEMs would have an
incentive to auction pre-installation rights to the highest
bidder, depending on the relative demand for different
browsers. For this reason, it is not clear that Microsoft's
demands upon OEM's raised Netscape's costs over what they
otherwise would have been. 16
2. Java on Its Own
The D.C. Circuit interpreted the district court as endorsing
four theories of how Microsoft's Java-related conduct amounted
to unlawful monopolization.' 7 It affirmed on three of these
ANTITRUST BULL. 619, 640-41 (1999) (describing Java technologies).
11. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
12. McGowan, supra note 6, at 772 & n.149.
13. See Findings, supra note 7,
James Gosling).

328.1(ii) (citing testimony of Sun's

14. McGowan, supra note 6, at 773.
15. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).

16.

Lopatka & Page, supra note 1, at 855; McGowan, supra note 6, at 772

& n.149.
17. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74. Three of these four findings are discussed

in detail in Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 653-57. I say the D.C.
Circuit interpreted the district court's conclusions of law this way because it is
not clear to me that the district court intended to suggest that Microsoft broke
the law by developing an efficient but incompatible JVM. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing Microsoft's Java-related

activity).
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theories, which I will discuss in turn. Two of the theories suffer
from a lack of evidence to substantiate the premises on which
they rest. The government introduced evidence to establish the
premises of the third theory, but did little to relate this theory
to actual market harm. Before discussing these theories, I
briefly analyze the theory the court of appeals rejected.
a. The Microsoft JVM and Developer Tools
Microsoft developed a JVM for Windows, and Java
development tools for Windows. These technologies were
incompatible in certain respects
with Sun's Java
implementation. They made it easier for developers to treat
Java as just another development tool for Windows. The easier
it was for developers to treat Java this way, the more likely it
would be that Java would wind up as a Windows development
tool, rather than as a nascent cross-platform substitute for
Windows.' 8 Making it easier for developers to treat Java this
way made such treatment more likely. This was Microsoft's
general strategy for dealing with Java. 19
The D.C. Circuit interpreted the district court as holding
Microsoft liable for developing its JVM (which was the fastest
and in some ways best JVM on the market) and its Java
development tools. The D.C. Circuit reversed on this point,
holding that the technologies were not exclusionary because
they helped developers write Java for Windows more
20
efficiently.
The court's reasoning on this point was sound. Microsoft's
JVM and tools lowered the cost to developers of using Java as a
Windows tool. Developers may or may not have felt the lower
costs of writing only to Windows were worth the possibly higher
costs of porting their programs to other operating systems
should they want to do so, but that was their choice. 2 1 Offering
developers a Windows-only Java option also put competitive
pressure on Sun to improve cross-platform Java, inducing
22
technology competition, which antitrust policy should favor.
18. See Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 649, 653, 658.
19. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (discussing how Microsoft's efforts
affected incentives to write cross-platform programs).
20. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75.

21. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C.
1999) (discussing the costs to developers of porting programs).
22. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49-50 (discussing the importance of innovation
and inter-standards competition).
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This decision complicated the rest of the court's analysis,
however. The government's basic claim was that Microsoft
tried to fragment Java to keep it from becoming a crossplatform substitute for Windows. 23 As a practical matter,
"fragmenting" meant getting developers to use Java to write
Windows-only programs instead of cross-platform programs.
To the extent Microsoft used lawful means to give developers
incentives to do so, it becomes harder to ascertain how its
24
allegedly unlawful conduct affected the market.
b. Deceiving Developers
The district court held that Microsoft violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act by deceiving software developers. 25 The first
premise of this theory was that Microsoft distributed Java
development tools that would help developers write Java
programs for Windows efficiently, but which programs would
then run only on Windows. 26 The D.C. Circuit held that
Microsoft's development of incompatible tools did not, standing
alone, violate the Sherman Act, however, so by itself this
27
premise alone proved nothing.
The second premise of this theory was that Microsoft
tricked developers into "unwittingly" using these tools to write
Windows-specific programs when the developers intended to
write cross-platform programs. 28 The conclusion was that this
deception, and the confusion it caused, impeded Java's progress
in the market. 29 Impeding Sun's progress extended Microsoft's
30
monopoly.
The district court found that Microsoft used two means of
deceit: It distributed its Java tools with its Windows-specific
23. Id. at 76 (describing the government's fragmentation theory).
24. Id. at 75 (stating that the JVM, however, does allow applications to
run more swiftly and does not itself have any anticompetitive effect); see also
Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 658.
25. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 43 (D.D.C.
2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
26. See Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 642-44. In particular,
Microsoft extended the Java programming language by adding two words to it,
distributed a tool called J/Direct that allowed developers to incorporate
Windows code more easily into Java-language programs, and modified the
Java class libraries for a time. Id.
27. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75.
28. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 43-44.
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modifications as the default settings, and it did not warn
developers that these defaults created the risk that they would
write Windows-only programs. 3 1 Based on these acts, the
district court concluded that Microsoft "deliberately designed
its Java development tools so that developers who were opting
for portability over performance would nevertheless
unwittingly32 write Java applications that would run only on
Windows."
This language is worded with care. The district court did
not actually say that any actual developers had been deceived.
The D.C. Circuit read it that way, however. It described the
district court as finding that "developers who relied upon
Microsoft's public commitment to cooperate with Sun and who
used Microsoft's tools to develop what Microsoft led them to
believe were cross-platform applications ended up producing
applications that would run only on the Windows operating
33
system."
The evidence submitted at trial supports neither the D.C.
Circuit's unqualified assertion that actual developers were
confused nor the district court's elliptical suggestion of the
same point. The government presented no direct evidence that
Microsoft actually lied to anyone, nor that any developers had
34
been confused.
31. The language is worth quoting in full:
Microsoft designed its Java developer tools to encourage developers to
write their Java applications using certain "keywords" and "compiler
directives" that could only be executed properly by Microsoft's version

of the Java runtime environment for Windows. Microsoft encouraged
developers to use these extensions by shipping its developer tools with
the extensions enabled by default and by failing to warn developers
that their use would result in applications that might not run
properly with any runtime environment other than Microsoft's and

that would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to port to JVMs
running on other platforms.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 106-07 (D.D.C. 1999).
32. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
33. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).

34.

Even the government's proposed findings of fact tacitly concede the

point. The findings offer as a tag line the conclusion that "Microsoft misled

developers so that they unwittingly wrote Java programs that turned out to be
Windows-specific, even when the developer intended to create a cross-platform
program." Findings, supra note 7, $1331. In support of this claim, however,

the government cited only hearsay testimony from Sun's James Gosling to
support a different claim: "The absence of warnings about the impact of
utilizing Microsoft's extensions created a significant potential for developer
confusion and the creation by them of Java programs that were not cross-
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Indeed, the testimony the government cited in its proposed
findings of fact on this issue (from Sun's James Gosling)
steered away from such a claim.
[T]he issue wasn't so much.., the code that they [developers]
themselves directly wrote. But a lot of it had to do with what
libraries did they use, because if they used a library that was tainted
with Microsoft-specific extensions, then their applications wouldn't
run. And while the developer might have been aware when they wrote
their own code whether or not they were using these things-they
weren't necessarily aware, because a lot of the stuff was
automatically generated by the tool, but whenever they incorporated
libraries from other places, you know, they might have been sort of
acquiring this problem,
and it wasn't at all obvious when this problem
35
would show up.

The logic of this testimony is poor. It seems to concede that
the issue is not that actual developers had been or would be
confused-which is how the district court and D.C. Circuit
treated this theory. Instead, this testimony suggests that
developers might unwittingly incorporate into programs they
wrote platform-specific code from other programs.
The
testimony does not explain how this would happen if the real
issue is not confusion, however. Nor does it suggest any other
reason why the "tainted library" problem was Microsoft's
problem, nor why programmers would fail to spot the problem
36
when they tested their code, as Sun suggested they do.
Other facts suggested the risk of confusion might be low. A
developer could disable Microsoft's Java extension by clicking a
box labeled "disable Microsoft extensions." 37 Dr. Gosling
dismissed this fact on the ground that the box was "several
menus deep."38 The proposition that professional developers
platform, but rather Windows-specific."
Id. $ 331.2 (emphasis added).
Gosling's hearsay testimony is as follows: "I certainly had developers talk to
me who said that they had been developing with Visual J++ and then were
surprised to discover that the software they had developed was not portable."
Transcript of Trial at 58 (A.M. Session, Dec. 10, 1998), Microsoft (No. 98-1232)
(testimony of James A. Gosling), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/
transcripts/dec98/12-10-am.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter
Transcript of Trial]. Dr. Gosling did not name these developers. Id.
35. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 58-59 (A.M. Session, Dec. 10,
1998) (testimony of James A. Gosling). This testimony was elicited on crossexamination. The D.C. Circuit cited Dr. Gosling's direct testimony, which in
this trial was prepared in advance and submitted in affidavit form, but it did
not cite his cross. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76.
36. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 24 (A.M. Session, Dec. 10, 1998)
(testimony of James A. Gosling).
37. Id. at 63.
38. Id.
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were unable to disable the extensions because the dialogue box
was too far down the menu tree seems to me implausible. In
any event, the government offered no evidence that actual
developers found the disable function too obscure to use.
In addition, Microsoft introduced evidence that popular
industry magazines reported that Microsoft's Java tools tied
developers to Windows. 39 That fact alone suggests wellinformed developers would have known what Microsoft's
defaults were without being warned. That idea is strengthened
by the government's evidence that industry participants
worried about Microsoft's strategy: They worried about it
because they knew about it.40 In the analogous setting of a
securities fraud action regarding publicly traded securities,
Microsoft would have had a good argument that any
misrepresentations (had the government shown any) did not
affect the market because it was already informed about the
41
relevant facts.
The D.C. Circuit referred to Microsoft's "campaign to
deceive developers," 4 2 but the evidence of what Microsoft
actually did does not justify any inference that the companies
succeeded. The government presented good evidence that
Microsoft employees hoped developers would not notice that
using Microsoft Java tools would produce Windows-only
programs. 43 But there was no evidence that those hopes were
realized. There was no evidence of lies; there was no evidence
of actual confusion.
Because the government produced no evidence of actual
deceit, its theory reduced to the question of how far actual
deceit may be inferred from Microsoft's hopes. On that score,
the court of appeals was right to stress elsewhere in its opinion
39. Def.'s Ex. at 1952, 1992, Microsoft (No. 78-1232), http://www.
microsoft.com/presspass/trial/exhibits/feb99/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 18 (P.M. Session, Nov.
18, 1998) (testimony of John Sorying).
41. See, e.g., Weilgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1989) (recognizing a truth-on-the-market defense to securities fraud claim); In
re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same).
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
43. See, e.g., id. at 76-77. The D.C. Circuit quoted one internal e-mail in
which a Microsoft employee suggested the firm not emphasize the Windowscentered aspect of its Java work and simply "assume that people will take
more advantage of our classes without ever realizing they are building win32only java apps." Id. at 76.
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that courts must be cautious in inferring market harm from a
defendant's intentions. 44 Especially because confusion should
have been easy to prove if it actually existed, 4 5 evidence of
Microsoft's hopes should not have been enough to infer actual
46
deceit.
c. Agreements with Independent Software Vendors
The D.C. Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding
that Microsoft violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by
agreeing to give Independent Software Vendors (ISVs) advance
access to Windows technologies if the ISVs would distribute
Microsoft's JVM as their default technology. 47 The D.C. Circuit
characterized the agreements as "exclusive in practice" though
"not literally exclusive." 48 The court held these agreements
were illegal because they foreclosed an important distribution
channel for Sun's JVM, thereby strengthening Microsoft's
monopoly position, and because Microsoft did not establish a
49
pro-competitive justification for the agreements.
If such agreements reduced distribution of Sun's JVM, they
might extend Microsoft's monopoly, but this theory is weaker
than the court of appeals implied. The record included
evidence that Microsoft's JVM ran programs written purely in
Java, and did so faster than other JVMs. 5° The government's
44. Id. at 59 ("[Olur focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the
intent behind it. Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is
relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the
monopolist's conduct.").
45. See infra Part IL.
46. That is true even if one is to accept as representing the policy of the
firm a suggestion by a single employee in a single e-mail about how he thought
the firm should proceed (rather than how it had been proceeding, even). There
are a host of problems with drawing such inferences. See David McGowan,
Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP. L.
485, 514-16 (1998) (discussing the problems with intent-based inferences in
antitrust cases).
47. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75-76.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id.
50. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 8 (A.M. Session, Dec. 10, 1998)
(testimony of James A. Gosling); Def.'s Ex. at 1952, 2025, Microsoft (No. 781232), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/exhibits/feb99/ (last visited
Feb. 25, 2003).
Some of the evidence was from computer magazine reviews of technology,
and therefore would be hearsay as to the question whether Microsoft's JVM
actually was faster than other JVMs. The evidence was relevant to what the
developer community believed, however, and Sun's James Gosling did not
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chief Java witness reacted churlishly to evidence that
Microsoft's JVM was very fast, but he did not dispute it.51 He
did testify that "quite often" Microsoft's JVM would run "a
fairly reasonable fraction" of Java applications (those written
52
without native operating system code) "perfectly fine."
Distributing Microsoft's JVM did not suppress development of
such applications.
In one respect, Microsoft's JVMs and Java tools did divide
the Java technology. If a developer wanted to incorporate
Windows code in a Java program, Microsoft's tools would allow
the developer to do so efficiently, but the resulting program
would not run on other JVMs. 53 It is not clear, however,
whether this fact mattered very much. Such programs would
not run across platforms, but programs using native code
(Windows or otherwise) were not cross platform at the time of
trial anyway. 54 Even Sun's James Gosling conceded at trial
that Java technologies had never allowed developers to write a
program once and have it run on any platform. Sun's story was
55
that things would get better in the future.
The district court condemned the agreements partly on
conjecture. The language of the agreements only required that
ISVs use Microsoft technology as a default; they did not
prohibit ISVs from distributing Sun's JVM. 56 The district court
thought ISVs would have no incentive to distribute other
JVMs, however, because they would all be writing Windows57
specific Java programs, which would not work on other JVMs.

rebut it when given the chance to do so. Id.
51. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 18 (P.M. Session, Dec. 10, 1998)
(testimony of James A. Gosling).
52. Id. at 14.
53. The district court noted this fact by saying only that Microsoft's and
Sun's JVMs were incompatible when native code was used. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 106 (D.D.C. 1999). The court of appeals did
not pick up on this limitation.
54. Even Sun's witnesses conceded this point. See Gifford & McGowan,
supra note 10, at 647-49. Sun's story was that its version of the technologies
made it much easier to write code across JVMs written for a particular
operating system, and reduced the costs developers would incur in adapting
such programs from one operating system to another. Id.
55. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 11 (A.M. Session, Dec. 10, 1998)
(testimony of James A. Gosling). The district court recognized this fact, too.
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
56. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
57. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 108-09.
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If ISVs chose to do so, however, it is hard to see why their
choice should count as harm to competition rather than as a
form of competition. Things would be different if ISVs were
duped. As we saw in the last section, however, there is no
evidence for that conjecture in the record, though such evidence
would have been relatively easy to obtain.
Finally, there was no evidence that these agreements
actually did retard Sun's progress relative to what it would
have been without the agreements. Even before the case was
filed, Microsoft publicly stated it would not enforce the ISVs'
obligations under the agreements, 58 and in separate litigation
with Sun it was temporarily enjoined from enforcing them. 59
The district court found only that Microsoft "remained free" to
enforce the provisions until November 1998.60
The D.C. Circuit correctly held that "[a] monopolist, like a
competitive firm, may have a perfectly legitimate reason for
wanting an exclusive arrangement with its distributors." 6' It
took Microsoft to task for not justifying the agreements,
however, rejecting as "competitively neutral" Microsoft's claim
that the agreements focused developer attention on the
Windows platform, thereby presumably improving the
performance of that platform. 62 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the agreements broke the law
because Microsoft could not offer a "procompetitive
63
justification" for the agreements.
Microsoft probably abandoned the agreements to avoid the

58.

Def.'s Answer, Fifth Affirmative Defense, Microsoft (No. 98-1232),

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass.doj/7-28answerdoj.asp (last visited Feb.
25, 2003). Microsoft appears to have abandoned all the agreements with
software vendors, though it did not abandon browser-related agreements with
a couple of large access providers, such as AOL.
59. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (noting the use of a November 1998
injunction prohibiting enforcement of such agreements). For a description of
the November 1998 litigation, see Sun v. Microsoft, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1027-

28 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (denying the motion to reinstate an injunction after the
9th Circuit vacated it).
60.
61.

Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 72.

62. Id.
63. Id.
65. For the district court's findings of fact on market power, see Microsoft,
84 F. Supp. 2d at 19-28 (finding the existence of Microsoft's monopoly power
through evidence of the corporation's excessive market share, a high barrier of
entry into the operating systems market, and a lack of "commercially viable
alternative[s] to Windows").
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risk of antitrust liability, so it deserves no great credit for doing
so. That the agreements were not enforced suggests that they
caused no harm, however, and raises the question of why
Microsoft broke the law by entering into them.
The court of appeals' requirement that Microsoft justify the
agreements might be reasonable in light of the evidence
65 It
showing that Microsoft had a great deal of market power.
does create a tension in the opinion, however, because the court
of appeals also concluded that Microsoft enhanced competition
by creating its JVM and Java development tools. 66 Distributing
those technologies therefore presumably created some benefits,
which would have to be weighed against whatever costs
stemmed from having Microsoft's Java technology rather than
Sun's as the default on ISV distributions.
One might respond that if these benefits were real, then
developers would have used Microsoft's technology as the
default even without the agreements, implying that wider
distribution should not count as a benefit. That is a good
argument. Microsoft might reply that the agreements signaled
its dedication to developing Java for Windows, cut through the
market noise to get the attention of developers, or that getting
a deal to do what one would have done anyway is just good
bargaining. Such arguments could follow one another for some
time without reaching definitive conclusions.
For all these reasons, even assuming the theoretical costs
to the ISV agreements exceeded the theoretical benefits, the
record offers no reason to believe that was the case for actual
costs and actual benefits. It is hard to say that condemning
those agreements actually improved welfare.
d. IntimidatingIntel
The D.C. Circuit also affirmed the district court's
conclusion that Microsoft violated section 2 by coercing Intel
Corporation into limiting its support for Java. 67 The evidence
on this point was by far the strongest the government
introduced to support its Java theory.
Microsoft and Intel occupy adjacent layers of the hierarchy

66.

See supra Part I.B.2.a (discussing how Microsoft's JVM and Java

development tools provided developers with a less expensive Windows-only
Java option that "put competitive pressure on Sun to improve cross-platform
Java").
67. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77; Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
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of complementary products that comprise personal computing.
Some degree of cooperation between the two firms is both
necessary and efficient.
The better their products work
together, the better personal computing works. At trial, no one
disputed the necessity of such cooperation.
The government's theory was that, with regard to Java,
Microsoft crossed the line from cooperating with Intel to
coercing it.68 The evidence showed that Microsoft demanded
that Intel choose sides regarding Java. 69 If Intel wanted Java
to become the new platform, thus displacing Microsoft's
operating system monopoly, then Microsoft was not going to
help Intel by giving it advance information. Microsoft might
instead seek a chip maker, such as AMD, that would side with
Microsoft on the Java issue and work to make Java just
another development tool for Windows.7 0 Its position was that
Intel could either be for it or against it, but not both.
Logically, Microsoft's position might or might not harm
competition. If Intel hedged its bets by supporting Java, it
might work less hard in its alliance with Microsoft. That would
make the "Wintel" alliance less robust in competition with
other combinations of complementary technologies.7 1 From this
angle, Microsoft's insistence that Intel choose sides might
enhance competition by giving Intel an unmixed incentive to
make the alliance as efficient as possible. On the other hand,
Microsoft's position might also reduce the chance that Sun
would displace Microsoft as the platform monopolist. If that
result enhanced welfare, then Microsoft's demands would
reduce welfare.
One cannot determine through a priori reasoning how
Microsoft's policy affected welfare. The government's position
makes the most sense if one assumes that the Wintel alliance
was already so strong that marginal increases to its strength
were trivial, and that the benefits of such increases would
almost certainly be outweighed by losses to rival technologies
such as Java. Java losses count only to the extent one assumes
that Sun's Java technology is an acceptable proxy for net
68.
69.
70.
71.

Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. at 109-10.
Id.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77; Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
This is of course the premise of the argument that exclusive contracts

may enhance inter-brand competition, which is one reason why the D.C.
Circuit recognized that such agreements may have significant pro-competitive
effects. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 69-70.
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welfare, such that gains to Sun would count as net gains in
welfare.
How one views the government's theory depends largely on
one's confidence in these assumptions. That in turn depends on
whether one feels comfortable with basing antitrust rulings on
such assumptions and the predictions they generate. Though
nominally falsifiable, there is no real way to know whether the
The relevant comfort levels are
predictions are right.
ultimately a psychological fact, though they may of course be
influenced by evidence and logic.
Microsoft's "choose sides" policy had two concrete effects.
In 1995, it tried to get Intel to stop Java development work. It
failed to stop the work, but it did persuade Intel not to support
Java publicly. 72 In 1997, Microsoft persuaded Intel to stop
working for a time on certain Java multimedia technologies
that competed with Microsoft's Java strategy. 73 Neither the
district court nor the D.C. Circuit said how long Intel refrained
from its work, though both implied it stopped only
74
temporarily.
The relevant Microsoft witness testified that Microsoft
tried to stop Intel from working for Sun and against Microsoft
by trying to make sure Microsoft was a better partner for Intel
than Sun was. 75 Surprisingly enough, the "smoking gun"
exhibit cited by the district court and the D.C. Circuit is
with this interpretation, though it does not compel
consistent
it.76 Neither the district court nor the court of appeals
72. Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 652-53.
73. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77.
74. Id. (quoting deposition testimony of Eric Engstrom, which said
Microsoft persuaded Intel to stop working on Java multimedia technologies
"for some period of time").
75. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 21-22 (P.M. Session, Feb. 23,

1999) (testimony of Eric Engstrom).
76.

Gov.'s

Ex.

235,

Microsoft

(No.

78-1232),

http://www.

microsoft.com/presspass/trial/exhibits/feb99/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). The
"smoking gun" was government exhibit 235, a string of e-mails regarding

multimedia technologies. The most important e-mail was from Microsoft's
Eric Engstrom, who worked with Intel on such technologies. He listed the
following as one of Microsoft's goals: "Intel to stop helping Sun create Java
Multimedia APIs, especially ones that run well (i.e. native implementations)
on Windows." The D.C. Circuit quoted part of this language. Microsoft, 253

F.3d at 77. The e-mail also said, however, that, "in the absence of a clear
direction and engaging partnership with [Microsoft],

[Intel] will end up

working with whomever makes the most noise in multimedia at the moment."
Gov.'s Ex. 235, Microsoft (No. 78-1232), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/

trial/exhibits/feb99/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
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acknowledged this testimony, though the court of appeals cited
deposition testimony from the same witness.77
The failure to refer to relevant evidence is troubling, but
hardly fatal. The testimony of Microsoft's witnesses was as
self-interested and self-serving as that of the Sun and Intel
witnesses the government called. 7 8 The district court certainly
was entitled to believe the latter over the former, though it is
possible that they all testified truthfully to the situation as
they saw it.
Neither the district court nor the D.C. Circuit tried to
ascertain how Intel's silence and the interruption of its work
affected Java in the market. That might be a reasonable
choice. Unlike the developer confusion or ISV allegations, for
which the government could have produced evidence of actual
developer behavior, it is hard to see how one could measure the
effects of these acts. If one interprets Microsoft's "choose sides"
policy as exclusionary, then it would be reasonable to place on
Microsoft the burden of showing that its interruption of Intel's
Java-related work caused no harm.
II. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Java aspect of the government's Microsoft case does
not show that antitrust litigation improves technology markets.
Nor does it show that such litigation cannot improve technology
markets. It does suggest some ways courts may improve the
likelihood that such litigation will produce net benefits rather
Mr. Engstrom testified at trial that he did want Intel to work with Microsoft
and not Sun, but that he sought to achieve this end by persuading Intel to
direct its scarce multimedia resources to working with Microsoft. Transcript
of Trial, supra note 34, at 7 (P.M. Session, Feb. 23, 1999) (testimony of Eric
Engstrom). He testified that his means of persuasion were to work harder to
be a better partner for Intel than Sun would be. Id. at 21-22. Engstrom's proMicrosoft testimony was as slanted toward Microsoft as the testimony of the
government's witnesses was slanted toward Sun, of course. For that reason a

court would be entitled to view it skeptically. Neither the District Court nor
the D.C. Circuit mentioned this testimony, however, not even to explain why it
should not be credited.
77. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77.
78.

The reflexive defensiveness of Sun's James Gosling, creator of the

Java technologies, is notable in this regard. Judging by the transcript (which
does not convey tone, facial expressions, body language, and other contextual
elements relevant to interpretations), he was a partisan witness, loathe to
confront squarely credible evidence that many of Java's problems were due to
deficiencies in the technology and incompatibility across generations of the
technology. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 7, 9, 12, 14-15
(A.M. Session, Dec. 3, 1998) (testimony of James A. Gosling).
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than net losses.
Apart from the deceit and ISV contract theories, which
should have been rejected for lack of evidence, the record shows
a mixture of three things: (1) actions by Microsoft that
enhanced welfare and which the court of appeals held lawful,
such as Microsoft's development of its JVM and Java
development tools; (2) unlawful actions by Microsoft, such as
intimidation of Intel, but for which no evidence of harmful
actions unrelated to Microsoft
effects was introduced; and (3)
79
that hurt Java in the market.
There is no way to measure the precise effects of these
different types of facts, much less to distinguish effects
attributable to lawful acts from those attributable to unlawful
ones. The district court recognized this when it acknowledged
that the evidence did not show that Netscape or Sun would
have become viable platform competitors but for Microsoft's
80
illegal acts.
Microsoft argued that because the government could not
show that its acts squelched competition that otherwise would
have eroded its monopoly power, the government had not
proved that Microsoft's acts "maintained" its monopoly. This
proposition is compelling as a matter of logic. It is not very
practical as a legal matter, however.
When both an act and a result exist in a complex, rapidly
changing environment filled with confounding variables,
proving that a particular act caused a particular result is
extremely hard. Litigants are never able to prove conclusively
how the world would have been different if the facts had been
different. 81 It is unreasonable to demand that they prove it by
79. This last category includes high-profile failures of Java projects
undertaken by Corel and Netscape, severe criticism of Java in the press,
including statements from Sun allies such as Netscape's Mark Andreeson and
IBM's John Soyring (a government trial witness), Def's Ex. at 1952, Microsoft
(No. 78-1232), Transcript of Trial at 12, supra note 34, (A.M. Session, Dec. 3.
1998) (testimony of James Gosling), and technical failures even Sun admitted,
such as incompatibility across some generations of Java technologies. Id. at 9,
16 (A.M. session, Dec. 3, 1998) (testimony of James Gosling) (discussing
project failures and Andreeson criticism).
80. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 111-12 (D.D.C. 1999).

81. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (discussing the difficulties in proving
causation). Indeed, it is impossible to prove logically the easier proposition
that the future will be the same if nothing changes. E.g. DAVID HUME, AN
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, at sec. IV, pt. II (1910),
http://eserver.org/18th/hume-enquiry.html (last visited April 3, 2003).
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a preponderance of concrete evidence, which they could not do.
It is unsatisfying to allow them to prove it by piling speculation
on top of speculation to create a preponderance of conjecture.
If one has faith that the antitrust laws are a force for good
in the world, or even just that they are laws and have to be
enforced, the logical force of Microsoft's causation argument
must be tempered by the limitations of litigation and the
necessary imperfections of real-world judgments. A standard
requiring that the government show what would have
happened if Microsoft's unlawful acts-and only those actshad not occurred would effectively put an end to antitrust
enforcement in such cases.
This reasoning sounds pragmatic, which it probably is. It
is also profoundly troubling. From a social welfare angle, it is
circular.8 2 Whether antitrust cases enhance welfare depends
on whether they punish welfare-reducing conduct without
deterring too much welfare-enhancing conduct. Whether they
do that depends on the liability standards those cases employ.
Setting low standards so that cases may be brought weakens
83
the connections between antitrust enforcement and welfare.
On the other hand, unless we are fairly confident that antitrust
actions will not improve things, we should not adopt liability
standards that preclude such actions altogether.
The D.C. Circuit finessed the causation problem. It said it
knew of no authority for the "proposition that, as to § 2 liability
in an equitable enforcement action, plaintiffs must present
direct proof that a defendant's continued monopoly power is
precisely attributable to its anticompetitive conduct." 84 The
court thought uncertainty about causation could be dealt with
better through tailoring remedies rather than deciding
85
liability.
On liability, the court said "[W]e may infer causation when
exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent
competitive technologies as well as when it is aimed at
producers of established substitutes."8 6 In the Microsoft case,
the court thought it was enough to ask "(1) whether as a
general matter the exclusion of nascent threats is the type of

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See McGowan, supra note 6, at 793 n.215.
This point is discussed in greater detail in id. at 791-94.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing significantly
to a defendant's continued monopoly power and (2) whether
Java and Navigator reasonably constituted nascent threats at
the time Microsoft engaged in the anticompetitive conduct at
87
issue."
The court's willingness to infer causation weakens the
connection between "anticompetitive acts" and actual harm to
competition. 88
The court might be read as limiting its
causation analysis to the type of "equitable enforcement action"
it had before it,89 but the opinion offers no doctrinal basis for
distinguishing liability standards in such cases from standards
in private damages actions. A pragmatist might argue that,
when the government presents reasons and evidence to suspect
certain conduct harms welfare, and a defendant cannot justify
the conduct as enhancing welfare, it makes more sense to
enjoin the conduct than to spend time speculating over things
that did not happen. That may be a defensible pragmatic
judgment, but its legal basis is not clear. 90
Even assuming the court was right to infer causation, its
approach could be improved in three ways. First, the degree to
which a court is willing to infer causation from either theories
of harm or evidence of a defendant's intention should vary
inversely with the difficulty of proving facts relevant to actual
harm. To the extent facts in a chain of reasoning are relatively
easy to prove, a court should require proof and reject
conjecture. The ultimate fact of general market harm may and
probably will require some degree of inference, but it will be
more or less reliable in proportion to the facts or lack of facts
farther up the chain. Where proof is cheap, it should be
required.
87.

Id.

88. Quoting the Areeda & Hovenkamp treatise, the court said that under
its approach "[t]o some degree, 'the defendant is made to suffer the uncertain

consequences of its own undesirable conduct."'
(quoting 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79
651c, at 78).

89. Id.
90. Against this argument one might say it is unfair to demand that firms
justify the utility of their behavior because business executives themselves
may not understand why or exactly how particular strategies work. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 5 (1984) ("Why do
particular practices work? The firms that selected the practices may or may

not know what is special about them."). This concern may be significant in
some cases. The record in United States v. Microsoft, however, provides
reason to believe that Microsoft's executives understood what they were doing
and why.
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The government's developer deceit theory illustrates how
this approach would work. As noted above, that theory rested
on the factual premise that developers actually did
"unwittingly" write platform-specific programs because
Microsoft set its Windows-specific tools as the default in its
Java distributions. 91 If that premise were true, it would not be
hard to submit evidence of such mistakes.
Individual
developers could be deposed or subpoenaed, as market analysts
are subpoenaed and deposed in the analogous context of
securities litigation. Better still, numbers of developers could
be surveyed about their practices. Sun submitted such a
survey in its private suit against Microsoft. 92 There is no
reason such evidence could not have been gathered on the
deceit issue, as well.
Such percipient evidence would be more reliable than the
self-interested speculation of competitors, or the bought
testimony of expert witnesses.
If a plaintiff introduced
evidence showing that developers were confused, a fact finder
would be justified in inferring that a defendant's conduct
caused market harm. The burden would rightly shift to a
defendant to rebut the inference. Because such evidence would
be relatively easy to get and relatively reliable, requiring that
plaintiffs get it would improve the connection between liability
findings and welfare losses without raising the causation bar
93
too high.
Second, even if the D.C. Circuit has effectively created a
separate standard of liability for equitable enforcement actions,
courts should continue to require evidence of causation in
private actions. It is one thing for the government to enjoin
conduct that probably does no good and might well reduce
welfare. 94 It is quite another to award treble damages and
91. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46.
92. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 639, 649-50
(D. Md. 2002) (discussing the Sun survey).
93. These same points apply to the idea that Microsoft's "first wave"
agreements caused ISVs to give up on Java. The government knows who those

ISVs are, and could easily ascertain what effects those agreements had on the
ISVs' Java development efforts. Because the theory assumes a reduction in

such efforts, and because that point is easily proved or falsified, evidence of
actual reductions should be required. If it is produced, inferences may be
drawn from particular reductions to general market harm.
94. This is so even if, as was the case in Microsoft, much of the
government's case consists of evidence from competitors grinding obvious axes

and trying to piggyback on public funds to compete in the courts as well as the
market. As a practical matter, however, much evidence in litigation about
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injunctive relief on the ground that harm actually has been
done. Private suits by competitors are fundamentally designed
to rectify harm. They may be a necessary means of enforcing
the antitrust laws, 95 but they are relatively less reliable as
proxies for social welfare than even competitor-infested
government litigation.
Sun's current antitrust suit against Microsoft exemplifies
the difference. The district court in that case recently ordered
Microsoft to distribute with Windows Sun's implementation of
the Java Runtime Environment for Windows. 96 That order
rests on the premise that "unless a preliminary injunction is
entered, Sun will have lost forever its right to compete, and the
opportunity to prevail, in a market undistorted by its
97
competitor's antitrust violations."
The court's conclusion on this point is questionable. The
same court denied Netscape's motion for summary judgment on
liability on the ground that the government's suit did not
establish that Microsoft's bad acts prolonged its monopoly. 98
That decision was correct. But the reasons that support denial
of that motion call into question Sun's premise in the
subsequent injunction proceedings which the district court
accepted as sound, that "if Microsoft had not committed its
anticompetitive
acts directed
toward thwarting the
implementation of Java, current and compatible Java runtime
environments would now be ubiquitous on PCs. "99
The discussion in Part I casts serious doubt on the
evidence the government introduced in its case to support the
same premise. It is true that issue preclusion prevents
Microsoft from re-litigating facts necessary to the judgment in
the government's favor, and the trial court in Sun's private

competition will come from competitors. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1989) (arguing that competitors
may be in the best position to detect and complain of antitrust violations).
95. Id.
96. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 240 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md.
2003).
97. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d at 646. The
Fourth Circuit later stayed the injuniction pending a ruling, on Microsoft's
appeal. 55 Fed. Appx. 197.
98. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39.
99. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 646. Sun did introduce at the preliminary
injunction hearing new evidence regarding the risk of market "tipping." Id. at
649-50. Evidence of prior harm, however, was taken from the government's
case. Id. at 654-56.
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litigation is bound by that doctrine. 00 Even so, however, the
district court in the government's case never explicitly said that
developers were actually deceived, that ISVs were actually
coerced by the first wave agreements, or even that Intel's
knuckling under actually hurt Sun.10 1 Judge Jackson candidly
acknowledged he could not say how Sun would have done
without these acts; his factual findings do not show the market
distortion on which the injunction rests. 02
The D.C. Circuit's exaggeration of the district court's
findings has the beneficial effect of setting a higher standard
for liability in future cases than was actually met in the
government's case. Litigants drawing analogies between their
case and Microsoft will have to argue about effects the court of
appeals described but which the district court did not actually
find. That higher standard tightens the connection between
liability and welfare, which is good news insofar as antitrust
law aims at enhancing welfare.
Subsequent proceedings
suggest it may have the opposite effect for Microsoft.
Third, theories of causation should be neutral as among
competitors. This seems an obvious point-little more than an
extension of Chief Justice Warren's dictum that antitrust
protects competition, not competitors. 0 3
It is hard to
implement with innovation claims, however.
Without a
potential substitute technology that has been thwarted,
maintenance claims are implausible. With such technology, the
government must impliedly endorse a path of innovation in
which substitution is likely to occur. It must treat deviations
100. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38.
101. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 30 (D.D.C. 2000),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 110 (D.D.C. 1999). The district court in
Sun's private suit appeared to read more into the findings of fact from the
government's suit than the findings actually say, no doubt in part because the
D.C. Circuit did so as well. Compare In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
237 F. Supp. 2d 639, 660 (D. Md. 2002) (stating that "in the Department of
Justice action findings were made (which the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars Microsoft from challenging) that Microsoft's deception of developers about
surreptitious language and development tool modifications were antitrust
violations"), with supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (observing that the
district court had not said that developers were actually deceived).
102. Compare Microsoft, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 654-55 (discussing the findings
of fact in the government's case) with Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30;
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
103. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 (1962)
("[Elxpansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small
independent stores may be adversely affected.").
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from that path as undesirable, which in practice risks backing
104
particular firms.
The government's case illustrates the point. Though it did
not endorse one platform or the other as such, its Java theory
essentially presumed that a world in which Sun controlled the
evolution of the Java technologies was better than a world in
which Microsoft "fragmented" Java by attempting to turn it
into just another Windows programming tool. That assumption
creates a lot of problems.
For example, Java technologies form what is essentially a
translation device. Translation takes time. 0 5 Java therefore
presents developers with a trade-off between writing one
program that could run on any operating system, but which
might run relatively slowly, or writing the program for
particular operating systems.
If Java worked as advertised (as noted above, it did not' 0 6),
a developer writing a Java application could cover more
operating systems at a lower cost than a developer who wrote
the application once for Windows and re-wrote it for other
operating systems. The second developer's application would
run faster, however. If consumers valued speed, the second
developer might have greater sales and a higher yield to his
work than the first, even if the first developer's costs were
lower. In the real world of imperfect cross-platform Java,
"fragmenting" might offer developers an equilibrium between
translation time and portability that developers might value
In addition, there are costs to allowing Sun to control Java.
Microsoft's witnesses testified its extensions to the Java
language might actually have improved it. 10 7 Sun never said
the extensions were technically bad, only that Microsoft had
added them on its own without Sun's approval. 10 8 Microsoft's
acts did bypass Sun's process, thus trading off the rate of
development against the degree of consensus in the
development process. This point was made explicitly at trial
during questioning by Judge Jackson. 109
104. McGowan, supra note 6, at 786-88.
105. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 23 (A.M. Session, Nov. 11,
1998) (testimony of Steven McGeady).
106. See supra notes 50-55, 78-79 and accompanying text.
107. Gifford & McGowan, supra note 10, at 645-46.
108. Id. at 645. For its part, Microsoft accused Sun of acting strategically
by freezing it out of the development process. Id. at 647.
109. Transcript of Trial, supra note 34, at 22-23 (P.M. Session, Dec. 10,
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Is fast development better than consensus development? I
doubt antitrust law can answer that question. To the extent it
has anything to say, I suspect it would be based on the premise
that consensus is better because it is more likely to produce
cross-platform technology rather than just another Windows
scripting tool. That, however, is the question to be decided by
developers, not assumed as a premise of antitrust law. The
government's theory of innovation was tied too closely to Sun's
business plan for Java, which is a final reason why we cannot
be confident that it has left us better off than we were before.
CONCLUSION
I do not wish to imply that Microsoft is the victim of
injustice. Many of its actions were notionally desirable but,
given its high degree of market power, potentially destructive
in the real world. It played hardball in the markets, and it
faced hardball in the courts. If one is skeptical of industrial
policy crafted by lawyers and administered through courts, as I
am, the case is not a resounding success, but neither is it the
end of the world.
The Microsoft case tells us not to expect too much when
antitrust and intellectual property collide. It tells us that
ideology matters a lot in deciding to bring such cases, and in
evaluating the results. Individual presumptions about whether
markets, courts, or government do better at innovation or the
allocation of resources matter, too, as do the self-confidence or
risk aversion of lawyers, economists, and judges who make the
predictions on which allegations are made and on which rulings
rest. In these respects, I suppose, the Microsoft case tells us
that antitrust cases dealing with intellectual property are like
many other antitrust cases, only more so.
Are we better off than we were six years ago? Insofar as
the Java aspect of the Microsoft case is concerned, there is no
reason to believe we are. In part that is because there is no
very good reason to believe Microsoft's conduct made us worse
off than we should have been. In part it is because we do not
know how the remedy will affect things, and we will not be able
to measure its effects very precisely anyway. For the vast
resources devoted to the case-the most significant antitrust
case in a generation-one would have hoped for more.

1998) (testimony of James Gosling).

